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Historical account of the Battle of Tarawa
In 1943, U.S. forces advanced through the Central Pacific,
continuing the offensive thrust aimed ultimately at the Japanese
home islands. The plan of attack called for them to take the
Gilbert Islands, then the Marshalls and finally the Marianas.
For Operation Galvanic, the seizure of the Gilberts, the
5th Amphibious Corps under Marine Major General Holland M.
"Howlin' Mad" Smith was chosen as the landing force.
The corps consisted of the 2nd Marine Division under Major
General Julian C. Smith and the Army's 27th Infantry Division,
led by Major General Ralph C. Smith. The 2nd Marine Division
would take Tarawa, and the 27th Infantry Division would
take Makin Atoll, 100 miles north of Tarawa on a line to the
Marshalls.
The Gilberts were a vital first step in the Central Pacific
campaign. Without them, land-based reconnaissance and combat
planes could not reach the Marshalls. Carrier-based planes,
which had the reach, could not provide the integrated photo
reconnaissance necessary for planning the Marshalls operation.
The Gilberts also offered Japanese-constructed airstrips and
a shortened supply route to the south and southwest areas
of the Pacific.
Tarawa Atoll, specifically Betio Island, was selected
as the target of the main assault because it contained an
airfield and the bulk of the
Japanese defenses. The atoll, at no point higher than
10 feet above sea level, is a triangular string of long, narrow
coral islands with Betio at the southwest corner.Surrounded
by a barrier reef, Betio presented a serious challenge to
amphibious landing craft, which would hang up on the reef
if there wasn't a sufficient tide depth to allow them to cross.
Once across the reef, the 2nd Division Marines assigned to
Betio, which measured roughly 3 miles wide and 600 yards deep,
would face formidable defenses. According to naval historian
Samuel Eliot Morison, the water around the island was rife
with mines, barbed wire and barricades designed to divert
landing craft into lanes that were heavily covered by artillery.
The Japanese had hundreds of guns, among them a system of
heavy machine guns protected by coconut logs, sand, concrete
and armored plate; 14 coast defense guns, all with underground
ammunition storage and fire control systems; 25 37-mm and
75-mm field guns in shelters that were immune to direct hits
from all but the largest guns; and an unknown number of anti-aircraft
guns.
Japanese defenders on Betio also had built a system of
bombproof shelters made of coconut logs braced with angle
irons. The roofs of these shelters were at least 6 feet
thick and covered over with sand, logs and corrugated iron.
Only heavy-caliber armor-piercing or other delayed-action
shells could penetrate them. These shelters were also compartmented,
so that the defenders enjoyed protection from grenades and
explosives hurled through the openings.
Altogether, the Japanese occupied 500 pillboxes, bunkers
and other strong points on the small island. In the words
of U.S. Army historians, "Tarawa was the most heavily
defended atoll that would ever be invaded by Allied forces
in the Pacific."
Preliminary Attacks
Planners of Operation Galvanic wanted to take Betio
quickly, before the Japanese could bring what were believed
to be powerful submarine and air forces into the arena. To
preserve strategic surprise, they ruled out concentrated air
and naval bombardment until immediately before the assault.
On Nov. 17-18, planes and ships from the Navy's Southern
Carrier Group bombed islands throughout the Gilberts to keep
the enemy confused about where the assault would come. While
these raids took out some of Betio's guns, their most significant
benefit was that they caused the Japanese to shoot off ammunition.
On Nov. 20, Betio's defenders had only 4,800 rounds of 75-mm
and 127-mm antiaircraft ammunition, and 15,000 rounds of 13-mm
machine gun bullets.
D-Day
The Marines landed Nov. 20, 1943, on Betio's northwest
shore. The 2nd Marine Division came up with the innovative
idea of using logistical support amphibian tractors (LVTs)
as assault craft. LVTs would be effective in crossing the
island's fringing reef and man-made obstacles. Unfortunately,
there were only enough LVTs for the first three assault waves.
After that, unless the tide was right, the Marines would have
trouble getting the remaining waves across the reef in Higgins
boats (LCVPs), which had a draft of 3-1/2 feet.
Betio's northwest shore was divided into Red Beach 1,
2 and 3, respectively, from west to east. A 500-yard pier
marked the boundary between Red Beach 2 and Red 3 and extended
north into the lagoon just beyond the fringing reef. The short
western side of the island was designated as Green Beach.
The Marines hoped to land a three-battalion front on the Red
beaches, sweep across the island (a total distance of about
600 yards), capture the airfield and pin the enemy down on
the island's west end.
Sustained naval bombardment and carrier-based bomber strikes
preceded the Marines. Timing and communications problems made
these less effective than needed, but Japanese gunners were
stopped long enough to allow the first three assault waves
to reach the beach relatively unscathed.
The 2nd Scout-Sniper Platoon led by 1st Lieutenant William
D. Hawkins landed first, winning the pier from enemy snipers.
Then, the first elements of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines
came in on Red Beach 1. On the left of their beach,
at the boundary with Red Beach 2, was a Japanese strong
point that raked the Marines coming in on the west side of
Red 1 with machine gun fire. Once landed, the Marines on Red
1 would take 35-50 percent casualties. Red 3 was the
next beach reached, by the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines. Part
of this group got as far inland as the airstrip before the
Japanese recovered from naval bombardment. This group took
only 25 casualties in landing.
The most violently opposed landing was that of 2nd Battalion,
2nd Marines on Red 2. Some of these troops were driven off
course by machine gun and anti-boat fire and forced to land
on Red 1. The remainder, who reached Red 2, managed to carve
out a beachhead only about 50 yards deep.
Once the first three assault waves were in, two waves of
landing boats were set to follow. These carried additional
troops, tanks and artillery. Unfortunately, the irregular
tides in the Gilberts worked against the landing force, and
there was not enough water depth over the reef for the landing
boats to cross. Infantry and howitzer crews had to wade ashore
with weapons and equipment.
These men suffered the worst casualties of D-day. The only
cover from Japanese machine gunners and riflemen was the pier;
many did not reach it. Many of those who did were separated
from their units and chain of command, and were unable to
move to their proper beaches. At this point, the momentum
of the assault bogged down because the reef effectively barred
the landing boats, the number of amphtracs was being rapidly
reduced, units were disorganized and communications were spotty.
The fierce action on the beach did not stop to allow the
Marines to regroup, establish command posts, move in supplies
or carry out their wounded. In the words of Marine historians,
only "the grim determination of individual Marines, who
simply kept coming, in spite of all the enemy could hurl at
them," offset the confusion.
By evening, the Marines' situation was tenuous at best. Of
about 5,000 men who had gone ashore, 1,500 were either killed
or wounded. Marines held a perimeter about 700 yards wide
and 300 yards deep at the base of the pier, and an area about
150 yards by 500 yards at the northwest tip of the island.
Most believed that a Japanese counterattack was bound to come
during the night. If it had, it may well have succeeded. Julian
Smith said that the Japanese commander lost the battle of
Tarawa that night by failing to attack. Historians say the
Japanese counterattack did not come because Japanese communications
had been severely damaged by naval gunfire.
At nightfall, Navy ships cruised offshore for protection
against air and submarine attack. Throughout D-day, the destroyers
Ringgold, Dashiell, Frazier and Anderson had provided gunfire
support on call to Marines ashore, a significant contribution
to the course of the battle. Frazier continued this duty throughout
the night.
Bombing and strafing had gone on
all day--32 strikes in all, launched from carriers
and escort carriers. Navy medical corpsmen continued working
throughout the night to ferry the wounded over the reef in
rubber rafts, while Marines carried water, pack howitzers,
ammunition and medical supplies ashore.
D Plus 1 Day
Early on the morning of Nov. 21, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,
who had spent almost 20 hours in boats waiting to land, fought
their way in to reinforce the beachhead on Red 1. Battalion
casualties were severe: while wading ashore, the men took
heavy machine-gun fire from strong points on the beach, as
well as intense sniper fire from Japanese hiding in the hulks
of sunken craft along the reef.
The second day of fighting on Betio was a yard-by-yard
struggle. By noon, Marines fighting from Red Beach
2 gained the southern coast of the island, cutting the
Japanese defenders into two groups. Third Battalion, 2nd Marines
on the western end of the island, supported by close naval
gunfire and Sherman medium tanks (in their first combat deployment
in the Pacific), succeeded in clearing all of Green Beach.
This provided a secure beach for landing reinforcements and
equipment.
With both beachheads expanded and the movement of reinforcements
and supplies brought under control, Colonel David M. Shoup,
senior commander on the island, radioed Julian Smith in late
afternoon that the Marines were winning. The unopposed landing
of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines at dusk on Green Beach
gave Shoup his first fully intact, fully equipped infantry
unit to deploy inland.
Bairiki
Also on Nov. 21, reports said that the Japanese were crossing
from the southeast end of Betio Island to Bairiki, a nearby
islet. Julian Smith committed the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines
to halt them and secure Bairiki. These Marines landed in late
afternoon, unresisted. Naval gunfire supporting their landing
had put a quick end to the small number of Japanese fighters.
A strafing plane hit a can of gasoline near the Japanese machine
gun nests. The can exploded and burned out the enemy. The
Marines then set up artillery on Bairiki to help in winning
Betio.
D Plus 2 Day
Early on the morning of Nov. 22, the Japanese defenders of
Betio sent a final, desperate message. In part, the message
said that their weapons had been destroyed, and they were
attempting "a final charge." The charge did not
come until nightfall. By that time the Japanese-held portion
of Betio had diminished radically.
The Marines swept eastward. Sherman tanks, closely supported
by infantry, demolition experts and flamethrowers, pounded
enemy pillboxes and bomb shelters. At the end of the day,
Japanese still held strong points inland from Red Beach
1, at the eastern end of the airfield and at the eastern
end of the island. Three times during the night, Japanese
counterattacks surged from the eastern end of the island against
two companies of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines; three
times they were fought off with artillery, grenades, machine
guns, rifles and bayonets.
The destroyers Schroeder and Sigsbee also battered Betio's
defenders. The next morning, 325 Japanese bodies were counted,
but about 500 were believed still alive.
D Plus 3 Day
On the fourth day of battle, Nov. 23, the 3rd Battalion 6th
Marines successfully stormed the eastern end of the island.
The pocket of strong resistance behind Red Beach 1 was also
eliminated. Of the estimated 2,800 members of the Japanese
Special Naval Landing Force on Betio, only 17 survived to
surrender. Of the additional 2,000 Korean construction troops,
129 survived.
While the goal of clearing the remaining Japanese strongholds
was being accomplished, Marine engineers and Navy Seabees
(construction battalions) worked to repair Betio's airstrip.
At noon, a carrier-based plane landed there. Shortly after,
Julian Smith declared the island secure.
Securing the Atoll
The 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines continued its sweep through
the Tarawa Atoll, securing each island and islet. Other
than the Japanese they found on Bairiki, only one island,
Buariki, was occupied. On Nov. 26 in the Battle of
Buariki, the entire Japanese force of 156 fought to the death.
The Marines lost 34 killed, and 56 were wounded.
Campaign Results
Strategically, the victory at Tarawa opened the way to the
Marshall Islands. Tactically, it established the amphibious
assault as the method used thereafter to defeat Japan in the
Pacific campaign.
Tarawa was the first major amphibious assault in the Pacific
in which U.S. troops faced sustained opposition on the beach.
The American people were deeply disturbed by reports of high
casualties suffered by the 2nd Marine Division (1,027 dead,
88 missing and 2,292 wounded). The high casualties were a
result of making a direct assault against a determined, well-armed
and deeply fortified enemy. Inadequate preliminary bombardment,
communications problems and inexperienced boat handlers who
missed their landing destinations played a part.
The Navy-Marine Corps team learned much from Tarawa and quickly
applied this experience in seizing and defending atolls throughout
the Central Pacific. Among the lessons learned at Tarawa were
the need for naval gunfire of greater duration and accuracy,
coordinated close air support, more LVTs and improved battle
communications.
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